Do Stronger Patents Stimulate or Stifle Innovation? The Crucial Role of Financial Development by Chu, Angus C. et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Do Stronger Patents Stimulate or Stifle
Innovation? The Crucial Role of
Financial Development
Angus C. Chu and Guido Cozzi and Shiyuan Pan and
Mengbo Zhang
Fudan University, University of St. Gallen, Zhejiang University,
University of California, Los Angeles
September 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88196/
MPRA Paper No. 88196, posted 26 July 2018 12:25 UTC
Do Stronger Patents Stimulate or Stie Innovation?
The Crucial Role of Financial Development
Angus C. Chu Guido Cozzi Shiyuan Pan Mengbo Zhang
July 26, 2018
Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based
growth model with nancial frictions. We nd that whether stronger patent protection
stimulates or sties innovation depends on credit constraints faced by R&D entrepreneurs.
When credit constraints are non-binding (binding), strengthening patent protection stimu-
lates (sties) R&D. The overall e¤ect of patent protection on innovation follows an inverted-U
pattern. An excessively high level of patent protection prevents a country from converging to
the world technology frontier. A higher level of nancial development inuences credit con-
straints through two channels: decreasing the interest-rate spread and increasing the default
cost. Through either channel, a higher level of nancial development stimulates innovation,
but the two channels of nancial development interact with the e¤ects of patent protection
di¤erently. Via the interest-spread (default-cost) channel, patent protection is more likely to
have a negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development.
We test these results using cross-country regressions and nd that patent protection and
nancial development have a negative interaction e¤ect on innovation.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based
growth model, in which a country invests in R&D to adopt technologies from abroad and may
gradually converge to the world technology frontier. Our growth-theoretic analysis of patent policy
features nancial frictions in the form of potentially binding credit constraints on R&D entrepre-
neurs. As in Aghion et al. (2005), due to moral hazard, R&D entrepreneurs may not be able
to borrow as much as they want for their R&D investment. When these credit constraints are
non-binding, we nd that strengthening patent protection by increasing patent breadth leads to a
larger amount of monopolistic prot, which stimulates R&D and technological progress. This pos-
itive monopolistic-prot e¤ect captures the traditional view of patent protection. However, when
the credit constraints are binding, we nd that the monopolistic distortion arising from patent
protection leads to more severe nancial frictions, which stie R&D and slow down technological
progress. We refer to this e¤ect as a negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection.
The intuition of this nancial distortionary e¤ect can be explained as follows. As in the
seminal study by Nordhaus (1969), patent protection causes monopolistic distortion, which in
turn reduces aggregate income in general equilibrium and tightens credit constraints faced by R&D
entrepreneurs in the presence of nancial frictions. Our mechanics relies on credit constraints to
make R&D a constant fraction of aggregate income. Then, the monopolistic distortion of patent
protection on aggregate income reduces R&D and economic growth when credit constraints are
binding. Hence we nd that credit constraints jeopardize the classical Schumpeterian trade-o¤
between static and dynamic e¢ ciency: less static e¢ ciency (i.e., lower output) by causing less
R&D will entail less dynamic e¢ ciency (i.e., lower growth). In this case, stronger patent protection
reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth, in addition to reducing the level of output.
This nding is consistent with recent studies that often nd the presence of negative e¤ects
of patent protection on innovation.1 Furthermore, we nd that the positive monopolistic-prot
e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of patent protection is below a threshold value,
whereas the negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of
patent protection is above the threshold. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on R&D
and innovation follows an inverted-U pattern that is commonly found in empirical studies.2
In terms of transition dynamics, we nd that at an early stage of development, credit constraints
tend to be binding because there are many novel technologies for the entrepreneurs to transfer
from the frontier. As the economy converges to the world technology frontier, credit constraints
may become non-binding if the level of patent protection is low or may remain binding if the
level of patent protection is high. An excessively high level of patent protection even prevents a
country from converging to the world technology frontier. In this case, the countrys technology
level relative to the world technology frontier converges to zero in the long run.
We consider the case in which a higher level of nancial development inuences credit con-
straints through two channels: increasing the default cost as in Aghion et al. (2005) and decreasing
the interest-rate spread. Empirical studies, such as Lerner and Schoar (2005), Qian and Strahan
(2007) and Liberti and Mian (2010), often nd that nancial development reduces interest rates
and the collateral spread of capital. We nd that by decreasing the interest-rate spread or increas-
1See for example Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008).
2See for example Qian (2007) and Lerner (2009).
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ing the default cost, a higher level of nancial development stimulates innovation. Intuitively, by
decreasing the interest-rate spread, the interest rate becomes lower, which in turn increases the
present value of future monopolistic prots and the value of inventions. By increasing the default
cost, R&D entrepreneurs are less likely to default, and hence, banks are more willing to lend to
entrepreneurs for their R&D investment.
Interestingly, the two channels of nancial development interact with the e¤ects of patent
protection in di¤erent ways. We nd that via the interest-spread (default-cost) channel, patent
protection is more likely to have a negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation under a higher level
of nancial development. The intuition of these results can be explained as follows. When the
interest-rate spread decreases, the present value of future prots and the value of inventions in-
crease. Consequently, entrepreneurs are incentivized to borrow more funding for R&D, rendering
the credit constraints more likely to be binding in which case patent protection has a negative
e¤ect on innovation. When the default cost increases, banks become more willing to lend to
R&D entrepreneurs, rendering the credit constraints less likely to be binding in which case patent
protection has a positive e¤ect on innovation.
We test the above theoretical implications using cross-country regressions. We nd that patent
protection and nancial development have direct positive e¤ects on economic growth. This nd-
ing is consistent with Ang (2010, 2011) who also empirically explore the e¤ects of both patent
protection and nancial development on R&D activities. We complement the analysis in Ang
(2010, 2011) by considering the interaction e¤ect of patent protection and nancial development
on economic growth. In summary, we nd that patent protection and nancial development have
a negative interaction e¤ect on innovation, which is consistent with the interest-spread channel
through which patent protection is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a
higher level of nancial development. Therefore, to capture the complete e¤ects of patent policy on
economic growth, it is useful to take into consideration the interaction between patent protection
and nancial development.
This study relates to the literature on patent policy. In this literature, Nordhaus (1969)
provides the seminal study in which he shows that increasing patent length causes a positive e¤ect
on innovation and a negative static distortionary e¤ect on welfare. While Nordhaus (1969) focuses
on a partial-equilibrium framework, we consider a dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) model in
which the monopolistic distortion caused by patent protection interacts with nancial frictions to
a¤ect credit constraints and stie innovation. Subsequent studies in this literature, such as Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), explore patent breadth in addition to patent length.
Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review of this patent-design literature. Our study
instead explores the e¤ects of patent policy in a DGE model in which the nancial distortionary
e¤ect of patent policy arises through a general-equilibrium channel. Therefore, this study relates
more closely to the macroeconomic literature on patent policy and economic growth based on
DGE models.
The seminal DGE analysis of patent policy is Judd (1985), who nds that an innite patent
length maximizes innovation and eliminates the relative-price distortion because all industries
charge the same markup. Our model features an innite patent length under which the relative-
price distortion is absent as in Judd (1985).3 However, we show that patent breadth interacts
3Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) also show that the optimal patent length is innite and argue that "the policy
margin of patent length is not a useful one on which to operate."
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with a nancial distortion that a¤ects credit constraints and R&D. Subsequent studies in this
literature explore patent breadth as an alternative patent-policy instrument; see for example, Li
(2001), Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).4 Some of these studies also nd
that strengthening patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on innovation and growth. Our study
di¤ers from these previous studies by exploring the e¤ects of patent protection in the presence of
nancial frictions and in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based growth model that enables us to explore
the technology convergence of countries. Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2014) also analyze the e¤ects of
patent protection in a distance-to-frontier model and show that the innovation-maximizing level of
patent protection depends on the income level of a country. However, the abovementioned studies
neither feature nancial frictions nor consider the interaction between patent protection and credit
constraints, which are the novel contributions of this study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the theoretical results. Section 4 discusses the regression results. The nal section concludes.
2 An R&D-based growth model with credit frictions
In this section, we consider a distance-to-frontier R&D-based growth model with nancial frictions
based on the seminal work of Aghion et al. (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2006). We modify their
Schumpeterian model into a variety-expanding model and allow the value of inventions to depend
on multiple periods of prots and an interest-rate spread that a¤ects the present value of future
prots. We consider a discrete-time model and use the model to explore the interaction e¤ects of
patent protection and credit constraints on the technology convergence of countries.
2.1 Households and workers/entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of countries, indexed by a superscript i, that are behind the world technology
frontier.5 For simplicity, we follow previous studies to assume that countries do not exchange goods
or factors but are subject to international technology spillovers from the frontier. There is a unit
continuum of innitely-lived households in each country. These households own intangible capital
(in the form of patents that generate monopolistic prots) and consume nal good (numeraire).
The lifetime utility function of the representative household in country i is given by
U i =
1P
t=0
Cit
(1 + )t
,
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and Cit is consumption of the represen-
tative household in country i at time t. The asset-accumulation equation is Ait+1 = (1+r
i
t)A
i
t Cit .
4For other patent-policy instruments, see ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) and Kiedaisch (2015) on
patentability requirement, Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) on protection against imitation,
Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and Sener (2012) on rent protection activities, and Chu (2009),
Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012), Chu and Pan (2013) and Cozzi and Galli (2014) on blocking patents. These studies
neither consider nancial frictions nor the distance-to-frontier approach.
5In this study, we do not model the behavior of the technology frontier and simply take it as given.
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From standard dynamic optimization, the linear utility function implies that in equilibrium the
real interest rate is equal to the discount rate, such that rit = .
In addition to the innitely-lived households in the economy, we follow previous studies to
assume the presence of overlapping generations of workers/entrepreneurs in each period to create
a need for the entrepreneurs to borrow funding for R&D. At the beginning of each period t, L
workers enter the economy, and they work to earn wage W it . At the end of the period, each
worker becomes an entrepreneur and devotes part of her wage income iW it to R&D, where
i 2 (0; 1].6 At the beginning of the next period, those entrepreneurs who have succeeded in
their R&D projects sell their inventions to households and use the proceeds for consumption.
Without loss of generality, we normalize L to unity. A worker who enters the economy in period
t has the utility function uit = y
i
t + Et[o
i
t+1]=(1 + ), where y
i
t denotes consumption when young
and Et[oit+1] denotes expected consumption when old. If the amount of her R&D spending Z
i
t is
less than iW it , then a worker/entrepreneur simply consumes W
i
t   Zit in period t or saves part
of it subject to the market interest rate rit. However, if Z
i
t > 
iW it , then the worker/entrepreneur
would need to apply for a loan subject to credit constraints, which will be described in details in
Section 2.7.
2.2 Final good
The nal-good sector is perfectly competitive. Firms in this sector employ workers and a con-
tinuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods v 2 [0; N it ] to produce nal good using the following
production function:
Y it = (L
i
t)
1 
Z N it
0
[xit (v)]
dv, (1)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1    in production. Lit is labor
input. xit (v) is the amount of intermediate goods v 2 [0; N it ], and N it is the number of available
intermediate goods in country i at time t. Competitive rms take the prices of nal good and
factor inputs as given to maximize prot. The conditional labor demand function is given by
W it = (1   )Y it =Lit, where Lit = L = 1 from the market-clearing condition. The conditional
demand function for intermediate goods is given by
xit (v) =


pit (v)
1=(1 )
, (2)
where pit (v) is the price of intermediate goods v in country i.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Each di¤erentiated intermediate good v is produced by a rm that owns the patent of the product
and has market power, which is determined by the level of patent protection to be explained below.
6Here we assume that the entrepreneur may not be able to devote her entire wage income to R&D. Our results
also hold when i = 1.
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In industry v, the rm produces xit (v) units of intermediate goods using x
i
t (v) units of nal good
as inputs. Therefore, the prot function of the rm in industry v is
it (v) = p
i
t (v)x
i
t (v)  xit (v) =

pit (v)  1
  
pit (v)
1=(1 )
, (3)
where the second equality follows from (2).
Using (3), one can derive the prot-maximizing price pit (v) given by 1=. To capture the e¤ects
of patent protection, we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to model patent breadth i 2 (1; 1=) as a
policy parameter. The idea is that the unit cost for imitative rms to produce xit (v) is 
i, which
is assumed to be increasing in the level of patent protection; therefore, a larger patent breadth
i allows the monopolistic producer of xit (v), who owns the patent, to charge a higher markup
without losing her market share.7 In this case,
pit (v) = 
i. (4)
Combining (3) and (4), we obtain the amount of prot as a function of patent breadth given by
it (v) =
 
i   1 
i
1=(1 )
 (i), (5)
which is increasing in i for i  1=.
2.4 Aggregate production function
Substituting (2) and (4) into (1) yields
Y it =


i
=(1 )
N it . (6)
Equation (6) shows that the growth rate of Y it is determined by the growth rate ofN
i
t . Furthermore,
for a given N it , the level of Y
i
t is decreasing in patent breadth 
i, which captures the e¤ect of
markup distortion on the level of output. In other words, by increasing the price of intermediate
goods, a larger markup leads to less intermediate goods being produced and also less nal good
being produced.8 In the presence of credit constraints, patent protection would then generate a
negative e¤ect on R&D as a result of this markup distortion as we will show later.
7See also Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a similar formulation in R&D-based growth models.
This formulation captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise
price and originates from the patent-design literature; see for example Gallini (1992) who considers the case in
which a larger patent breadth increases the imitation cost of imitators.
8This distortionary e¤ect would be absent if xit (v) were produced from a xed factor input instead of the
nal good. However, if we follow Romer (1990) to assume that intermediate goods are produced from capital,
then the markup distortion would still exist because the presence of markup and prots lowers capital income
and reduces capital accumulation. However, allowing for capital accumulation would complicate the transition
dynamics substantially.
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2.5 R&D and the value of patents
In each country, there is an R&D sector. In each period t, workers/entrepreneurs devote nal
good to R&D at the end of the period to invent new intermediate goods that will be produced in
the next period. Here "new" intermediate goods refer to novelty only for the domestic economy
as these intermediate goods have already been developed at the frontier. In other words, R&D is
for the purpose of technology transfer from the frontier to the domestic economy. Furthermore,
patentability requirement being based on local novelty is a common assumption in this type of
models.
To ensure balanced growth, we assume that each entrepreneur spreads her R&D spending Zit
over N it R&D projects.
9 Therefore, the amount of nal good that an entrepreneur devotes to
each of her R&D projects is Zit=N
i
t , and the probability of her R&D projects being successful is
P it = minfZit=(N itit); 1g,10 where 1=it captures country is productivity in R&D.
We follow Acemoglu (2009, chapter 18) to assume that it is an increasing function in N
i
t=Nt,
where Nt is the level of technology at the world technology frontier. Nt grows at a constant rate
g > 0, which is taken as given by other countries. Lets dene country is relative technology level
to the frontier as it  N it=Nt 2 (0; 1), which is an inverse measure of the countrys distance to the
world technology frontier. We adopt the following specication for it:
it = [(
i
t)
 + ]

Zit
N it

, (7)
where the parameters f; g > 0 and f; g 2 (0; 1) are common across countries. This speci-
cation features the catching-up e¤ect under which a less developed country that has a smaller
it is able to grow faster by absorbing more world technologies. The term (Z
i
t=N
i
t )
 captures an
intratemporal duplication externality of R&D as in Jones and Williams (2000). Given the unit
continuum of R&D entrepreneurs and the independence of R&D projects (across entrepreneurs),
the law of large numbers applies, so that the accumulation of inventions at the aggregate level
follows a deterministic process given by
N it  N it+1  N it =
Zit
it
=
N it
(it)
 + 

Zit
N it
1 
, (8)
where Zit=
i
t = N
i
tZ
i
t=(N
i
t
i
t) is the number of successful R&D projects in period t.
Each R&D project has a probability P it to give rise to a new variety of intermediate goods.
When a new variety is successfully invented at the end of period t, production of the intermediate
goods begins in period t + 1. We denote the value of an invention created in period t as V it (v).
Here we assume that the discount rate for future prots is given by ri + i = + i, where i  0
denotes an exogenous interest-rate spread in country i.11 For example, Lerner and Schoar (2005),
9To ensure the innovation probability P it  1 in the presence of growth in Zit , we only need to assume that
entrepreneurs spread their R&D spending Zit over &N
i
t R&D projects, where & > 0. Without loss of generality, we
set & = 1.
10For simplicity, we assume that an entrepreneurs R&D projects either all succeed or all fail.
11Our exogenous interest rate spread is analogous to the exogenous interest premium in Smets and Wouters
(2007). A potential microfoundation for this friction can be a nancial transaction cost (in terms of nal good),
which reduces the value of intangible capital in the form of patents.
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Qian and Strahan (2007) and Liberti and Mian (2010) nd that nancial development reduces
interest rates, the contracting cost of nancing and the collateral spread of capital. Here we use
the parameter i to capture these nancial frictions in a simple way.12
Under the assumption above, V it (v) can be expressed as
V it (v) =
1P
s=t
is+1 (v)
(1 + ri + i)s+1 t
=

 
i

+ i
, (9)
which is increasing in patent breadth i and decreasing in i. The positive e¤ect of i captures the
positive e¤ect of patent protection on the value of inventions. In a country that is more nancially
developed, there are less nancial frictions, which in turn reduce the interest-rate spread i and
increase the value of inventions. Finally, we make the following parameter restriction, which
guarantees that P it 2 (0; 1) and it 2 (0; 1).
Assumption 1 (g)1=(1 ) < 
 
i

=(+ i) < minf1=(1 ); [g( + )]1=(1 )g.13
2.6 Equilibrium without credit constraints
In this section, we explore the equilibrium level of R&D in the absence of credit constraints. The
zero-expected-prot condition of R&D is given by P itV
i
t = Z
i
t=N
i
t , which can be expressed as
V it = 
i
t ,
(i)
+ i
= [(it)
 + ]

Zit
N it

. (10)
Therefore, the level of R&D in any period t is given by
Zit =

(i)=(+ i)
(it)
 + 
1=
N it , (11)
which is increasing in i for a given level of relative technology it. The growth rate of technology
is given by
git 
N it
N it
=
1
(it)
 + 

Zit
N it
1 
=
1
[(it)
 + ]1=

(i)
+ i
(1 )=
. (12)
For a given it, the growth rate g
i
t in (12) is increasing in patent breadth 
i capturing the positive
monopolistic prot e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Furthermore, a higher level of nan-
cial development in the form of a decrease in the interest-rate spread i increases the growth rate
of technology. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
12See Sunaga (2017) for an interesting model of innovation cycles with an endogenous interest rate spread.
13The assumption 
 
i

=(+ i) < 1=(1 ) ensures P it < 1 for 
i
t 2 (0; 1). Derivations available upon request.
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Proposition 1 In the absence of credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a higher
growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development in the form of a decrease in the
interest-rate spread also leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Proven in text.
In the long run, it converges to a steady state, in which N
i
t grows at the same rate as Nt.
14
Setting git to the world technology growth rate g in (12) yields the steady-state level of relative
technology it given by
i =
1
1=
(
1
g

(i)
+ i
(1 )
  
)1=
 1(i
+
; i
 
), (13)
which is increasing in the level of patent breadth i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i.
Note that Assumption 1 ensures 1 2 (0; 1) in the steady-state equilibrium. Substituting (13) into
(11) yields the balanced-growth level of R&D given by
Zit = (
i)
g
+ i
N it , (14)
which is increasing in patent breadth i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i. In other
words, an increase in patent breadth i or a decrease in the interest-rate spread i causes the
entrepreneurs to want to do more R&D.
2.7 Equilibrium with credit constraints
Before the end of a period, each entrepreneur devotes her wage income iW it to N
i
t R&D projects
without borrowing. If the R&D spending Zit exceeds her wage income 
iW it , then she would have
to borrow Dit = Z
i
t iW it from a bank to nance her R&D projects. If her R&D projects succeed,
she repays the loan plus an interest payment equal to (1 + Rit+1)D
i
t at the end of the period. If
her R&D projects fail, she becomes bankrupt and repays nothing to the bank. Therefore, if the
entrepreneur truthfully reveals the outcome of her R&D projects, the expected payment received
by the bank is P it (1 + R
i
t+1)D
i
t + (1   P it )0. When banks make zero expected prot, we have
P it (1 +R
i
t+1)D
i
t = D
i
t, which implies P
i
t (1 +R
i
t+1) = 1.
What makes it di¢ cult to borrow is that an entrepreneur may want to default even when her
projects are successful. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to assume that banks do not observe
the outcome of R&D projects, and hence, the problem of moral hazard arises.15 Specically, by
paying a default cost hiZit where h
i 2 (0; 1), an entrepreneur can hide the outcome of her projects
and avoid repaying the loan. The cost parameter hi is an indicator of banks e¤ectiveness in
securing repayment and partly measures the level of nancial development in the country. In case
14We show the stability of this steady state in Section 2.8.
15As in Aghion et al. (2005), we do not consider the case in which patents can be used as collateral. To be more
precise, we assume that future patents cannot be used as collateral because R&D projects have not been completed
as the stage of borrowing. See Amable et al. (2010) for an interesting analysis on patents as collateral.
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an entrepreneur decides to default, the entrepreneur must incur the default cost before observing
the outcome of her R&D projects. Therefore, entrepreneurs would not default if and only if the
following incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint holds:
hiZit  P it (1 +Rit+1)Dit = Dit, (15)
where Dit = Z
i
t   iW it = Zit   i(1  )Y it . Substituting this condition into (15) yields
Zit 
i(1  )Y it
1  hi =
i(1  )
1  hi


i
=(1 )
N it , (16)
where the last equality uses (6). We refer to this IC constraint as a credit constraint, which
becomes tighter as patent breadth i increases capturing an interaction between the monopolistic
distortion of patent protection and the nancial distortion of the credit constraint. The intuition
can be explained as follows. When patent breadth i increases, aggregate income Y it decreases
due to the markup distortion. As a result, a larger i reduces the income of entrepreneurs and
their ability to borrow for R&D. This interaction e¤ect exists so long as entrepreneursability
to borrow is a¤ected by their income and in turn entrepreneursincome is related to aggregate
income.
For convenience, we dene f i  i(1   )=(1   hi) 2 (0;1) as a composite parameter that
is increasing in the default cost hi. Then, substituting (16) into (8) yields the growth rate of
technology in the presence of a binding credit constraint:
git =
N it
N it
=
1
(it)
 + 
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 
. (17)
For a given it, the growth rate g
i
t in (17) is decreasing in the level of patent breadth 
i capturing
the abovementioned nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Furthermore,
a higher level of nancial development in the form of an increase in the default cost f i increases
the growth rate of technology.16 We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In the presence of binding credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a
lower growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development in the form of an increase
in the default cost leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Proven in text.
Equations (14) and (16) show that the balanced-growth level of R&D spending Zit satises
Zit = min
(

 
i
 g
+ i
; f i


i
=(1 ))
N it . (18)
16If nancial friction is modeled as screening of R&D projects as in Aghion and Howitt (2009, chapter 6) instead of
credit constraints, then nancial development would still stimulate innovation. However, patent breadth would no
longer have a negative e¤ect on innovation due to the absence of credit constraints. In reality, nancial development
should a¤ect the screening of R&D projects and the tightness of credit constraints. So long as credit constraints
are present, the negative e¤ect of patent breadth on innovation would exist whenever they are binding.
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There exists a unique value of patent breadth i below (above) which the credit constraint does
not bind (is binding) in the long run. Equating 
 
i

g=( + i) and f i(=i)=(1 ) yields this
threshold value of i given by17
1(f
i
+
; i
+
)  g
g   (+ i)f i , (19)
which is increasing in the countrys default cost f i and the interest-rate spread i. The intuition of
these two results can be explained as follows. First, a larger default cost f i reduces entrepreneurs
incentives to default and enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit
constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value of patent breadth.
Second, a lower interest-rate spread i increases entrepreneursincentives to invest in R&D. As
a result, the credit constraint becomes more likely to be binding, which in turn decreases the
threshold value of patent breadth. In this case, a higher level of nancial development has di¤erent
implications on the threshold value of patent breadth depending on whether nancial development
is reected by an increase in the default cost or a decrease in the interest-rate spread.
2.8 Transitional dynamics and convergence
Using the denition of relative technology level it, we can derive its law of motion given by
it+1
it
=
N it+1
N it
=
Nt+1
Nt
, it+1 =

1 + git
1 + g

it. (20)
In the absence of credit constraints, we use (12) to express the law of motion for it as
it+1 =
it
1 + g
(
1 +
1
[(it)
 + ]1=

(i)
+ i
(1 )=)
 H i1(it). (21)
Even if the credit constraint does not bind in the long run, it may be binding in the short run
when it is small. When the credit constraint is binding, we can use (17) to express the law of
motion for it as
it+1 =
it
1 + g
8<:1 + 1(it) + 
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=;  H i2(it). (22)
Combining (21) and (22) implies that country is technology level relative to the frontier evolves
according to the following law of motion:
it+1 = minfH i1(it); H i2(it)g,
from which we derive a threshold value ^i of relative technology level below (above) whichH i2 < H
i
1
(H i1 < H
i
2). In other words, when relative technology level 
i
t is below this threshold ^
i, it+1 evolves
17To ensure that the threshold value 1 < 1=, we assume f
i < (1   )g=( + i), which is equivalent to
hi < 1  (+ i)=(g).
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according to H i2(
i
t) that is subject to the credit constraint. In contrast, when relative technology
level it is above the threshold ^
i, it+1 evolves according to H
i
1(
i
t) that is free from the credit
constraint. The threshold value ^i is given by
^i(i
+
; f i
 
; i
 
) 
(
1

"
(i)
(f i) (+ i)

i

=(1 )
  
#)1=
, (23)
which is increasing in patent breadth i but decreasing in the default cost f i and in the interest-
rate spread i. Intuitively, at a higher level of patent protection, the credit constraint is more
likely to be binding, which in turn expands the range of it within which 
i
t+1 evolves according
to H i2(
i
t) that is subject to the credit constraint. In contrast, when either the default cost or
the interest-rate spread increases, the credit constraint becomes less likely to be binding, which in
turn shrinks the range of it within which 
i
t+1 evolves according to H
i
2(
i
t).
In the following lemmata, we derive some properties of the functions fH i1 (it) ; H i2 (it)g, which
will be useful in determining the value of it at the steady state.
Lemma 1 H i1 (
i
t) is increasing and concave w.r.t. 
i
t, and satises the following properties:
H i1 (0) = 0, H
i
1 (1) < 1,
@H i1
@it
jit=0 > 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 H i2 (
i
t) is increasing and concave w.r.t. 
i
t, and satises the following properties:
H i2 (0) = 0,
@H i2
@it
jit=0 =
1
1 + g
8<:1 + 1
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=; .
Proof. See Appendix A.
In addition to the rst threshold value 1 of patent breadth dened in (19), we also dene a
second threshold value 2 of patent breadth below (above) which
@Hi2
@it
jit=0 > 1 (
@Hi2
@it
jit=0 < 1).
2(f
i
+
)  
"
f i 
g
1=(1 )
#(1 )=
, (24)
which is increasing in the default cost f i. We now consider three possibilities.
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Case 1 When i  1(f i; i), we have ^i  1(i; i). In this case, the credit constraint is initially
binding and then becomes non-binding before reaching the steady state.
In this case, the credit constraint is initially binding given a su¢ ciently low initial value of
i0. Intuitively, when the initial level of 
i
0 is low, the developing economy can transfer many new
technologies from the frontier. Therefore, given the large incentives for R&D, the credit constraint
is binding at the early stage of development. Overtime, it rises above ^
i, which is below the steady-
state level. At this point ^i, the credit constraint becomes non-binding, and then it converges
to the steady state in the long run. The steady-state value of relative technology it is given by
i = 1(
i; i), which is increasing in patent breadth i as shown in (13). The long-run growth
rate of technology in this country is g. Figure 1 shows that the steady state is stable.
1tm +
0 mˆ ( )1m b tm
1t tm m+ =
( )2 tH m
( )1 tH m
Figure 1: Convergence under i  1
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Case 2 When 1(f i; i) < 
i < 2(f
i),18 we have ^i > 1(
i) and @H
i
2
@it
jit=0 > 1. In this case, the
credit constraint is initially binding and remains binding after reaching the steady state.
In this case, the credit constraint is initially binding for the same reason as before. Overtime,
the developing economy converges to the steady state without reaching the point ^i at which the
credit constraint would have become non-binding. In other words, the credit constraint is binding
even in the long run. The steady-state value of relative technology level it is determined by the
xed point i = H i2 (
i), which yields
i =
8<:1
241
g
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 
  
359=;
1=
 2(i  ; f
i
+
), (25)
which is decreasing in patent breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i. The long-run growth
rate of technology in this country is g. Figure 2 shows that the steady state is stable.
1tm +
0 ( )1m b( )2m b mˆ tm
1t tm m+ =
( )2 tH m
( )1 tH m
Figure 2: Convergence under 1 < 
i < 2
18Together with g < 1, Assumption 1 ensures that 1 < 2. Derivations are available upon request.
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Case 3 When i  2(f i), we have ^i > 1(i) and @H
i
2
@it
jit=0  1. In this case, the credit
constraint is always binding. Furthermore, the economy diverges from the frontier.
In this case, the credit constraint is always binding. Furthermore, the level of R&D in the
economy is so low that it grows at a lower rate than the frontier. Figure 3 shows that 
i
t converges
to 0, at which point we have
lim
t!1
it+1
it
= lim
it!0
H i2 (
i
t)
it
=
1
1 + g
8<:1 + 1
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=;  i(i  ; f i+ )  1. (26)
Therefore, the balanced growth rate in country i in this case is
gi = lim
t!1

(1 + g)
it+1
it
  1

= (1 + g) i   1  g, (27)
where i is decreasing in patent breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i.
1tm +
0 ( )1m b tm
1t tm m+ =
( )1 tH m
( )2 tH m
Figure 3: Divergence under i  2
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3 Patent breadth and credit constraints
Based on the results in the previous section, we can divide countries into three groups. We denote
the three groups as group 1, 2 and 3.
Group 1: For countries in group 1, their R&D activities are not restricted by the credit
constraint at the steady state, and their technologies grow at the same rate as the world technology
frontier in the long run. The levels of patent protection in these countries satisfy i  1(f i; i),
where the threshold 1(f
i; i) derived in (19) is increasing in the default cost f i and the interest-
rate spread i.
Group 2: For countries in group 2, their R&D activities are always restricted by the credit
constraint, but these countries can still keep pace with the growth rate of the world technology
frontier in the long run. The levels of patent protection in these countries satisfy 1(f
i; i) <
i < 2(f
i), where the threshold 2(f
i) derived in (24) is increasing in the default cost f i but
independent of the interest-rate spread i.
Group 3: For countries in group 3, their R&D activities are always strongly restricted by the
credit constraint. In this case, the long-run technology growth rate gi derived in (26) and (27) is
slower than that of the world technology frontier. The levels of patent protection in these countries
satisfy i  2(f i).
According to this classication, the relative technology level i of a country in the steady state
is given by
i =
8>>><>>>:
1(
i
+
; i
 
); if i  1(f i
+
; i
+
)
2(
i
 
; f i
+
); if 1(f
i
+
; i
+
) < i < 2(f
i
+
)
0; if i  2(f i
+
)
, (28)
and the balanced growth rate of technology is given by
gi =
8>>><>>>:
g; if i  1(f i
+
; i
+
)
g; if 1(f
i
+
; i
+
) < i < 2(f
i
+
)
(1 + g) i(i
 
; f i
+
)  1  g; if i  2(f i
+
)
. (29)
We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 There are three types of balanced growth paths in the world. First, when i 
1(f
i; i), relative technology level i converges to 1, and the growth rate of technology converges
to g. In this case, 1 is increasing in patent breadth 
i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread
i. Second, when 1(f
i; i) < i < 2(f
i), relative technology level i converges to 2, and the
growth rate of technology converges to g. In this case, 2 is decreasing in patent breadth 
i and
increasing in the default cost f i. Third, when i  2(f i), relative technology level i converges
to zero, and the growth rate of technology converges to (1 + g) i  1, which is decreasing in patent
breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i.
Proof. Proven in text.
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Figure 4
Figure 4 illustrates the three groups of countries.19 Countries in group 1 are not nancially
constrained at the steady state due to a high default cost f i. In this case, stronger patent protection
increases the amount of monopolistic prot, which in turn stimulates R&D and increases the
relative technology level 1 in the long run. A higher level of nancial development in the form of
a lower interest-rate spread i increases the value of inventions and the relative technology level
1 in the long run.
Countries in group 2 are always nancially constrained due to a moderate default cost f i. In
this case, stronger patent protection amplies monopolistic distortion and reduces the level of
output, which in turn tightens the credit constraint on R&D and decreases the relative technology
level 2 in the long run. A higher level of nancial development in the form of a higher default
cost f i enables the entrepreneurs to borrow more funding for R&D, which in turn increases the
relative technology level 2 in the long run.
For a given value of the default cost f i, an increase in the level of patent protection may cause
a country in group 1 to fall into group 2; therefore, there exists a technology-maximizing level of
patent protection 1. This technology-maximizing level of patent protection 1 is a¤ected by the
level of nancial development. First, it is increasing in the default cost f i. As mentioned before, a
larger default cost f i reduces entrepreneursincentives to default, which enables them to borrow
more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn
increases the threshold value 1 of patent breadth and renders patent protection more likely to
have a positive e¤ect on R&D.
Second, the technology-maximizing level of patent protection 1 is increasing in the interest-
rate spread i; in other words, a decrease in the interest-rate spread leads to a lower technology-
maximizing level of patent protection. Intuitively, a lower interest rate increases the value of
inventions and raises entrepreneursincentives to invest in R&D. As a result, the credit constraint
becomes more likely to bind, which in turn decreases the threshold value 1 of patent breadth and
renders patent protection more likely to have a negative e¤ect on R&D.
A higher level of nancial development increases the cost of default but decreases the interest-
rate spread in a country. Therefore, under a higher level of nancial development, it is not clear
19The relative position of the curves in Figure 4 can be derived analytically. Together with g < 1, Assumption 1
ensures that countries in group 1 never fall directly into group 3. Derivations are available upon request.
17
whether patent protection would become more likely to have a positive or negative e¤ect on
innovation. This depends on whether nancial development increases the default cost or decreases
the interest-rate spread. We summarize all the above results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Financial development has a positive e¤ect on innovation (measured by the rela-
tive technology level in the long run) whereas patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on inno-
vation. If nancial development increases the default cost, then patent protection would be more
likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. If -
nancial development decreases the interest-rate spread, then patent protection would be more likely
to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development.
Proof. Proven in text.
Finally, countries in group 3 have a very low default cost f i. Given that R&D entrepreneurs
have strong incentives to default in this case, they are not able to borrow much funding for R&D.
As already shown in Proposition 3, the steady-state growth rate of these countries is given by
(1 + g) i  1  g, where i(i; f i) derived in (26) is decreasing in the level of patent breadth. An
increase in the default cost helps to mitigate this problem and raises the steady-state growth rate.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we examine the empirical evidence of our theoretical predictions. The implications
of our theory that will be tested are the followings:
1. The likelihood that a country converges to the frontier growth rate increases with its level
of nancial development but decreases with its level of patent protection.
2. In a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, nancial development has a positive
e¤ect on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
3. In a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, patent protection has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
4. Under a higher level of nancial development, patent protection can be more likely to have
a negative or positive e¤ect on the steady-state level of relative per-capita GDP.
4.1 Data
The dataset consists of 103 countries from 1980 to 2009 featuring variables of economic growth,
patent protection, nancial development and other controls.20 The data of the variables are
available either annually or every 5 years on the years ending with 0 or 5. We transform the
20See Appendix B for description and sources of data.
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dataset into a cross section by taking annual average of the annually available variables for each
country and taking average of all available observations over the sample period for the variables
available every 5 years. The growth rate of a country is taken to be the average annual growth rate
of GDP per capita between 1980 and 2009. For the measure of patent protection within a country,
we consider the commonly used index of patent rights developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and
Park (2008).21 The data for nancial development is based on the Financial Development and
Structure Dataset from Cihak et al. (2012).
Following King and Levine (1993) and Beck et al. (2010), we take advantage of three indicators
of nancial intermediation that can proxy the overall development of a countrys nancial system.
The rst measure is the private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as
a ratio to GDP, denoted as private credit. The second indicator is deposit money banksassets
as a ratio to GDP, denoted as bank assets. The third indicator is liquid liabilities as a ratio to
GDP, denoted as liquid liabilities. We use private credit as our preferred measure of nancial
development as in Ang (2010, 2011) and consider the other two measures as robustness checks
because as stated in Levine et al. (2000), private credit excludes credit granted to the public sector
and credit granted by the central bank and development banks.
In our theoretical model, the amount of borrowing as a ratio to output is given by
Dit
Y it
=
Zit   iW it
Y it
= min
(

 
i
 g
+ i

i

=(1 )
; f i
)
  i(1  ),
where the second equality follows from (18) and (6). Therefore, Dit=Y
i
t is increasing in the default
cost f i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i. In other words, an increase in Dit=Y
i
t in the
data may reect the e¤ect of a larger f i or the e¤ect of a smaller i.
4.2 Convergence regression
We use the convergence regression model based on Aghion et al. (2005) to test our theoretical
implications. The starting point of this model is that each country is assumed to be on a transition
path towards its steady state. From (20)-(22), patent protection and nancial development a¤ect
the relative growth rate of a country that is converging to the frontier given by (1 + git)=(1 +
g) = it+1=
i
t. In particular, (21) and (22) show that the initial relative technology level has a
negative e¤ect on the transitional relative growth rate and that nancial development always has
a positive e¤ect regardless of whether it increases the default cost f i or decreases the interest-rate
spread i. In countries without binding credit constraints, patent protection positively a¤ects
the transitional relative growth rate, whereas in countries with binding credit constraints, patent
protection negatively a¤ects the transitional relative growth rate.
This empirical analysis is an extension of Aghion et al. (2005) with the addition of patent pro-
tection, so we follow them to approximate our theoretical model by the following cross-sectional
21The index covers ve dimensions: 1) extent of coverage; 2) membership in international patent agreements;
3) provisions for loss of protection; 4) enforcement mechanisms; and 5) duration of protection. Each dimension is
assigned a value between zero and one. The overall index is the unweighted sum of these ve values, with a larger
value reecting a higher level of patent protection.
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regression, which can be used to investigate the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial develop-
ment on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP growth relative to the frontier:
gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i, (30)
where gi denotes the average annual growth rate of per-capita GDP, i denotes the average level
of patent protection, Fi denotes the average level of nancial development, yi is the log of initial
per-capita GDP, xi is a set of other control variables and "i is the disturbance term with mean
zero. The subscript i denotes country, and country 1 is the technology leader, which we take to
be the United States; hence we exclude the United States in all regressions.
Dene country is initial relative per-capita GDP as y^i  yi   y1. Then we can rewrite (30) as
gi   g1 = i  (y^i   y^i ) ,
where the steady-state value y^i is given by setting the right-hand side of (30) to zero (i.e., when
the growth rate di¤erence is zero):
y^i =
0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + xxi + "i
 (y + y  i + Fy  Fi)
. (31)
In (30), i is a country-specic convergence parameter given by
i = y + y  i + Fy  Fi. (32)
It is useful to note that a country converges to the technology frontier if and only if the growth
rate of its relative per-capita GDP depends negatively on the initial y^i; that is, if and only if
i < 0. Thus, from implication 1 we know that the likelihood of convergence would increase with
nancial development and decrease with patent protection if and only if
Fy < 0 and y > 0. (33)
From (31), the long-run e¤ects of nancial development and patent protection on the relative
output of a country that converges are as follows:
@y^i
@Fi
=   1
i|{z}
+
(F + Fi + Fyy^

i )| {z }
?
, (34)
and
@y^i
@i
=   1
i|{z}
+
( + FFi + yy^

i )| {z }
?
. (35)
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4.3 Relative-technology-level regression
In addition to the convergence regression, we also consider the following relative-technology-level
regression:
yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i, (36)
where yi is the average log of per-capita GDP, i is another disturbance term with mean zero, and
the other variables are dened in the same way as in the convergence regression. This regression
model also captures the implications from (21) and (22) that patent protection and nancial
development a¤ect a countrys relative technology level with respect to the technology frontier. It
is useful to note that our data sample covers 30 years, so we try to approximate the steady-state
level of relative per-capita GDP by yi y1, and hence, this regression model is used as an additional
test of implications 2-4.
4.4 Regression results
Considering the endogeneity of nancial development as discussed in Aghion et al. (2005) and
also the endogeneity of patent protection, we estimate the regression models using instrumental
variables. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to use legal origins as the instrument for nancial
development Fi. Given that patent protection i may be also endogenous, we use the following two
instruments. The rst instrument is the initial relative income yi   y1.22 The second instrument
is a simulated instrumental variable (SIV). For country i, we use the average degree of patent
protection of all the other countries (except country i) in 1980 as an instrument for country
is average patent protection over 1980-2009. We refer to this instrument as simulated patent
protection and denote it as sivi . This variable is to control for the endogenous response of patent
protection to changes in innovation activities within a country, and we assume that the changes
are not correlated across countries.23 The interacted terms between instruments are also used as
instruments for the interacted terms of the endogenous variables.24 We consider both GMM and
2SLS for robustness of estimation. Tables I and III report the estimation results from the 2-step
generalized method of moments (GMM), and Tables II and IV report the results from two-stage
least squares (2SLS).
Regarding the assumption of variable endogeneity and the choice of instrumental variables,
we use a joint test on the endogeneity of all endogenous regressors (including patent protection,
nancial development, their interacted terms, and their interaction with initial relative income),
and a joint test on the exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments. In our regressions we focus
on the exogeneity of simulated instrumental variables, so the suspect instruments are simulated
22To be more precise, we do not use yi  y1 as an instrument but only use its interaction with legal origins as an
instrument for i  Fi and its squared term as an instrument for i  (yi   y1).
23For a discussion of SIV, see for example Currie and Jonathan (1996) and Mahoney (2015). We use SIV to
deal with the issue of weak instruments. We nd that if we use initial relative GDP and/or initial openness as
instruments for patent protection, the two variables su¤er from the problem of weak instruments. Moreover, we
tried using lagged patent protection, which is the degree of patent protection within each country (from 1960 to
1979) before our sample period. All these regressions results are available upon request.
24Hence, the excluded instruments include the simulated patent protection, dummies of legal origins, the inter-
acted terms between simulated patent protection and legal origins, the interacted terms between legal origins and
initial relative income, and the squared term of initial relative income.
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patent protection and its interacted terms with legal origins and initial relative income. The p-
values of these tests are reported in all tables. As reported in Table I and II, the p-values of
endogeneity tests of endogenous regressors are overall below 10%, which implies these regressors
are indeed endogenous statistically. Moreover, the exogeneity tests of suspect instruments do
not reject the null hypothesis that these instruments are exogenous. Hence the simulated patent
protection is exogenous statistically. These results support our assumption of variable endogeneity
and the choice of instrumental variables, which ensures the robustness of our regression results to
some extent.
[Insert Tables I and II here]
From Tables I and II, we nd that the following results are robust and signicant for most of
the regressions: (1) y > 0, Fy < 0, y < 0; and (2)  > 0, F > 0, F < 0. The rst set of
results fy > 0, Fy < 0, y < 0g supports implication 1. It is useful to recall that a country
converges to the technology frontier if and only if i = y + y  i + Fy  Fi < 0. Therefore,
Fy < 0 and y > 0 imply that the likelihood of convergence increases with nancial development
but decreases with patent protection.
To understand the implications of the second set of results f > 0, F > 0, F < 0g, lets
being by assuming that all countries lag behind the United States in the steady state; i.e., y^i < 0.
Financial development would have a positive long-run e¤ect on the relative income of each country
that converges if and only if F + Fi + Fyy^

i > 0. In this term, Fi is negative because the
estimated F is negative, whereas Fyy^

i is positive because the estimated Fy is negative. The
result F > 0 implies that nancial development is likely to have a positive long-run e¤ect, and
this positive e¤ect is unlikely to vanish or become negative because F +Fyy^

i > 0. This nding is
consistent with implication 2. We also consider the magnitude of the coe¢ cients. From regression
1 of Table II, we have F + Fi = 0:0833  0:0234 i. Given a mean of 2.568 for i, F + Fi
is positive for the average country. Together with Fyy^

i > 0, nancial development has a positive
long-run e¤ect on the relative income of the average country. Moreover, we use equation (34) to
compute the long-run e¤ect of nancial development and nd that nancial development has a
positive long-run e¤ect in the vast majority of countries.
As for patent protection, it would have a positive long-run e¤ect in each country that converges
if and only if  + FFi + yy^

i > 0. In this term, FFi is negative because the estimated F
is negative, and yy^

i is also negative because the estimated y is positive. The result  > 0
implies that patent protection may have a positive long-run e¤ect, but this positive e¤ect may
turn negative because FFi + yy^

i < 0. From regression 1 of Table II, we have  + FFi =
0:0211 0:0234Fi. Given a mean of 0.448 for Fi, the average country has +FFi > 0. However,
given that yy^

i < 0 and that Fi can be as large as 1.776, patent protection would have a negative
long-run e¤ect in countries with su¢ ciently large Fi. In other words, patent protection has a
negative (positive) long-run e¤ect when the level of nancial development Fi is high (low). Using
equation (35) to compute the long-run e¤ect of patent protection, we nd that patent protection
has a positive (negative) long-run e¤ect in about one-third (two-thirds) of the countries, and
these countries have a low (high) level of nancial development. This nding is consistent with
implications 3 and 4 as well as the scenario in which the interest-spread channel dominates in
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inuencing credit constraints. In other words, when the level of nancial development is low (i.e.,
a high interest-rate spread in the model), patent protection has a positive long-run e¤ect. When
the level of nancial development is high (i.e., a low interest-rate spread in the model), the e¤ect
of patent protection becomes negative.
[Insert Tables III and IV here]
From Tables III and IV, we nd that  > 0, F > 0, F < 0 and y > 0. The implications of
this set of results are similar to the above, so we do not repeat the discussion and simply report
the results as a robustness check.
[Insert Table V here]
Finally, we also estimate the likelihood of convergence for each country. We use the coe¢ cients
in regression 1 of Table II to compute the estimated value of convergence parameter i, and its
standard deviation. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to classify a country as most likely to converge
in growth if its estimated i is at least two standard deviations below zero, as most likely to diverge
in growth if its estimated i is at least two standard deviations above zero, and as uncertain to
converge otherwise. As reported in Table V, we nd that none of the countries in our sample is
classied as most likely to diverge, and there are 48 countries (out of 102, since the United States
is excluded) that are classied as most likely to converge.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development on
economic growth. We nd that whether strengthening patent protection has a positive or negative
e¤ect on technological progress depends on credit constraints. When credit constraints are not
binding, strengthening patent protection has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. When credit
constraints are binding, strengthening patent protection has a negative e¤ect on growth. An
increase in the level of patent protection may cause the credit constraints to become binding.
As a result, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U
pattern. A higher level of nancial development inuences credit constraints via two channels:
decreasing the interest-rate spread and increasing the default cost. These two channels have
di¤erent implications on the e¤ects of patent protection. Our regression analysis nds evidence
that strengthening patent protection is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a
higher level of nancial development, which is consistent with the interest-spread channel. These
results show the importance of an often neglected interaction between the monopolistic distortion
caused by patent protection and the nancial distortion caused by credit constraints.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. From (21), we see that H i1 (0) = 0. Simple di¤erentiations yield
@H i1
@it
=
1
1 + g
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(1  ) (it) + 
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(it)
 + ](1+)=

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> 0, (A1)
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(1 )=
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Evaluating (A1) at it = 0 yields
@H i1
@it
jit=0 =
1
1 + g
(
1 +
1
1=

(i)
+ i
(1 )=)
> 1, (A3)
which is satised due to the assumption (i)= (+ i) > (g)1=(1 ) that ensures 1(
i) > 0.
Evaluating H i1 (
i
t) at 
i
t = 1 yields
H i1 (1) =
1
1 + g
(
1 +
1 
 + 
1=  (i)+ i
(1 )=)
< 1, (A4)
which is satised due to the assumption 
 
i

= (+ i) < [g( + )]1=(1 ).
Proof of Lemma 2. From (22), we see that H i2 (0) = 0. Simple di¤erentiations yield
@H i2
@it
=
1
1 + g
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Evaluating (A5) at it = 0 yields
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Appendix B: Description of the dataset
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset for 103 countries over 1980-2009. Variables
used for regression are listed below with denitions and data sources. The annual growth rate of
per capita real GDP are calculated through log di¤erences. In the cross-section regressions, the
annual variables are all averaged over the sample period.
 gi: the averaged annual growth rate of real per capita GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 yi: the log of real per capita GDP at the initial period (1980). Source: Penn World Table
7.1.
 yi: the average log of real per capita GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 i: the average degree of patent protection over 1980-2009, measured by the average index
of patent rights. Source: Park (2008).
 sivi : the average degree of simulated patent protection in 1980, measured by the average
index of patent rights excluding the country in question. Source: Park (2008).
 Fi: the average level of nancial development. There are three measures: 1) the average
value of private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of
GDP (private credit); 2) the average value of deposit money banksassets as a share of GDP
(bank assets); 3) the average value of liquid liabilities as a share of GDP (liquid liabilities).
Source: Cihak et al. (2012).
 seci: the average years of secondary schooling in the population over 15 in the initial period
(1980). Source: Barro and Lee (2013).
 inf i: the average ination rate over 1980-2009, dened as log di¤erence of GDP deator.
The data of Zaire is not available in the dataset. Source: World Development Indicator.
 gov i: the average government expenditure as a share of GDP over 1980-2009. The data of
Zambia is not available in the dataset. Source: World Development Indicator.
 openi: the average openness to trade over 1980-2009, dened as sum of real exports and
imports as a share of GDP. Source: World Development Indicator.
 legal i: Dummy variables for British, French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist legal ori-
gins. Source: La Porta et al. (2008).
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Summary statistics
Variable # of obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
i 103 2.568 0.907 0.500 4.721
Fi (private credit) 103 0.448 0.388 0.013 1.776
Fi (bank assets) 103 0.502 0.396 0.016 1.981
Fi (liquid liabilities) 103 0.511 0.395 0.063 2.721
gi 103 0.014 0.017 -0.037 0.084
yi 103 8.309 1.256 6.006 10.371
sivi 103 1.897 0.009 1.872 1.917
seci 103 1.409 1.073 0.060 5.190
inf i 102 0.473 1.492 0.012 9.718
gov i 102 0.153 0.046 0.048 0.290
openi 103 0.729 0.467 0.206 3.549
Legal origin classications
 British: Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, United Kingdom, Ghana,
Guyana, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Sir Lanka, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Swaziland,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania, Uganda, United States, South Africa, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
 French: Argentina, Burundi, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic,
Cote dIvoire, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, In-
donesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, Mali, Malta, Mozambique,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Paraguay, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, El Salvador, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zaire.
 German: Austria, Bulgaria, Switzerland, China, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea Repub-
lic, Poland.
 Scandinavian: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.
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Appendix C: Regression results
Table I: Convergence regression: 2-step GMM
Regression equation: gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.0166*** 0.0375*** 0.0378*** 0.0190*** 0.0418*** 0.0456*** 0.0195** 0.0242* 0.0215*
(3.16) (3.90) (3.43) (3.09) (3.67) (3.30) (2.54) (1.71) (1.70)
F 0.0626* 0.126*** 0.126** 0.0745** 0.146** 0.160** 0.0972* 0.0569 0.0495
(1.85) (2.85) (2.54) (2.04) (2.62) (2.49) (1.72) (0.61) (0.59)
F -0.0174** -0.0382*** -0.0383*** -0.0195** -0.0412*** -0.0448*** -0.0255* -0.0191 -0.0169
(-2.07) (-3.19) (-2.85) (-2.18) (-2.87) (-2.71) (-1.76) (-0.80) (-0.80)
y -0.0125** -0.0265*** -0.0272*** -0.0119* -0.0263*** -0.0302*** -0.00866 -0.0104 -0.00766
(-2.37) (-3.72) (-3.17) (-1.96) (-3.32) (-2.98) (-1.24) (-1.28) (-0.98)
y 0.00640*** 0.0128*** 0.0129*** 0.00565*** 0.0119*** 0.0130*** 0.00500** 0.00769*** 0.00693***
(3.17) (4.27) (3.90) (2.80) (4.32) (3.99) (2.37) (3.18) (2.94)
Fy -0.0242*** -0.0223*** -0.0221*** -0.0223*** -0.0185*** -0.0172** -0.0177** -0.0243** -0.0249**
(-4.70) (-4.09) (-3.93) (-4.39) (-2.96) (-2.58) (-2.09) (-2.23) (-2.47)
First-stage F-test
 189.6 81.16 83.67 189.6 81.16 83.67 189.6 81.16 83.67
F 13.36 9.836 9.022 11.79 11.59 10.94 12.70 4.531 4.547
  F 29.08 11.69 11.46 25.64 17.83 17.29 32.85 10.23 10.86
  y 102.8 13.70 13.38 102.8 13.70 13.38 102.8 13.70 13.38
F  y 45.70 9.034 8.719 43.82 8.129 7.902 8.995 5.054 4.961
OID (p-value) 0.2681 0.5038 0.4816 0.3594 0.8061 0.7889 0.4217 0.2686 0.3076
ENDOG (p-value) 0.0985 0.0246 0.0450 0.1055 0.0277 0.0523 0.0441 0.0429 0.0634
EXOG (p-value) 0.2043 0.3695 0.3404 0.2614 0.6721 0.6321 0.3587 0.2852 0.2976
R2 0.293 0.202 0.202 0.271 0.070 0.023 0.123 0.310 0.329
F-test 14.04 9.493 10.01 15.64 9.422 8.285 9.184 8.439 11.61
Sample size 102 100 100 102 100 100 102 100 100
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors
with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. We use simulated patent protection 
siv
i and
initial relative income yi   y1 as instruments for i. In all regressions we exclude the US, which is assumed to be
the frontier. In columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9), we drop Zaire and Zambia due to missing data. In columns
(2), (5) and (8), we add policy regressors sec, gov, inf, open. In columns (3), (6) and (9), we add policy regressors
plus dummy for OPEC countries. The term First-stage F-testrepresents the F stats in rst-stage regressions of
endogenous variables. OIDstands for Hansen J overidentication test of all instruments. ENDOGrepresents
the endogeneity test of endogenous regressors. EXOGstands for C test of exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect
instruments, where the suspect instruments are simulated patent protection and its interacted terms with legal
origins and initial relative income. All regressions are estimated by 2-step GMM estimator. We use the command
ivreg2in Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table II: Convergence regression: 2SLS
Regression equation: gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.0211*** 0.0335*** 0.0337*** 0.0228*** 0.0392*** 0.0414*** 0.0209* 0.0329** 0.0307**
(2.95) (3.06) (2.72) (2.85) (3.05) (2.69) (1.90) (2.01) (1.99)
F 0.0833* 0.127** 0.127** 0.0915* 0.151** 0.159** 0.0905 0.106 0.0965
(1.86) (2.54) (2.22) (1.69) (2.42) (2.21) (1.16) (0.99) (0.99)
F -0.0234** -0.0369*** -0.0369** -0.0242* -0.0414** -0.0436** -0.0238 -0.0318 -0.0291
(-2.05) (-2.72) (-2.39) (-1.81) (-2.58) (-2.34) (-1.21) (-1.17) (-1.18)
y -0.0161** -0.0237*** -0.0241** -0.0155** -0.0246*** -0.0269** -0.0106 -0.0158* -0.0142
(-2.25) (-2.81) (-2.44) (-2.02) (-2.65) (-2.33) (-1.20) (-1.68) (-1.47)
y 0.00748** 0.0109*** 0.0110*** 0.00679** 0.0109*** 0.0115*** 0.00593** 0.00959*** 0.00914***
(2.58) (2.97) (2.79) (2.55) (3.02) (2.81) (2.38) (2.95) (2.75)
Fy -0.0235*** -0.0214*** -0.0214*** -0.0209*** -0.0175** -0.0169** -0.0208* -0.0217* -0.0223*
(-3.25) (-3.16) (-2.99) (-2.87) (-2.35) (-2.08) (-1.91) (-1.70) (-1.88)
First-stage F-test
 189.6 81.16 83.67 189.6 81.16 83.67 189.6 81.16 83.67
F 13.36 9.836 9.022 11.79 11.59 10.94 12.70 4.531 4.547
  F 29.08 11.69 11.46 25.64 17.83 17.29 32.85 10.23 10.86
  y 102.8 13.70 13.38 102.8 13.70 13.38 102.8 13.70 13.38
F  y 45.70 9.034 8.719 43.82 8.129 7.902 8.995 5.054 4.961
OID (p-value) 0.2681 0.5038 0.4816 0.3594 0.8061 0.7889 0.4217 0.2686 0.3076
ENDOG (p-value) 0.0985 0.0246 0.0450 0.1055 0.0277 0.0523 0.0441 0.0429 0.0634
EXOG (p-value) 0.2043 0.3695 0.3404 0.2614 0.6721 0.6321 0.3587 0.2852 0.2976
R2 0.249 0.210 0.209 0.223 0.055 0.022 0.090 0.148 0.184
F-test 9.605 8.007 8.629 8.930 6.336 5.877 6.337 6.623 8.322
Sample size 102 100 100 102 100 100 102 100 100
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors
with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. We use simulated patent protection 
siv
i and
initial relative income yi   y1 as instruments for i. In all regressions we exclude the US, which is assumed to be
the frontier. In columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9), we drop Zaire and Zambia due to missing data. In columns
(2), (5) and (8), we add policy regressors sec, gov, inf, open. In columns (3), (6) and (9), we add policy regressors
plus dummy for OPEC countries. The term First-stage F-testrepresents the F stats in rst-stage regressions of
endogenous variables. OIDstands for Hansen J overidentication test of all instruments. ENDOGrepresents
the endogeneity test of endogenous regressors. EXOGstands for C test of exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect
instruments, where the suspect instruments are simulated patent protection and its interacted terms with legal
origins and initial relative income. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS estimator. We use the command ivreg2
in Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table III: Relative-technology-level regression: 2-step GMM
Regression equation: yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.336*** 0.357*** 0.352*** 0.415*** 0.433*** 0.429*** 0.407*** 0.401*** 0.387***
(5.50) (4.81) (4.67) (6.26) (5.26) (5.13) (5.63) (4.58) (4.70)
F 3.197*** 3.310*** 3.319*** 3.334*** 3.413*** 3.381*** 3.215*** 3.060*** 3.078***
(8.16) (8.26) (8.43) (9.82) (9.04) (9.18) (9.15) (8.05) (8.19)
F -0.740*** -0.789*** -0.791*** -0.776*** -0.813*** -0.805*** -0.753*** -0.762*** -0.768***
(-7.40) (-7.36) (-7.50) (-9.10) (-8.39) (-8.47) (-8.15) (-7.20) (-7.38)
y 0.864*** 0.901*** 0.908*** 0.838*** 0.892*** 0.889*** 0.899*** 0.943*** 0.960***
(26.49) (30.17) (27.47) (24.76) (28.44) (25.57) (24.27) (32.65) (33.34)
First-stage F-test
 194.5 79.72 83.33 194.5 79.72 83.33 194.5 79.72 83.33
F 9.576 9.914 9.184 7.946 8.351 8.363 11.12 3.532 3.713
  F 11.70 5.562 5.558 11.54 5.608 6.022 34.65 7.674 8.308
OID (p-value) 0.3158 0.4284 0.4361 0.2812 0.4381 0.4252 0.3226 0.2301 0.2973
ENDOG (p-value) 0.4931 0.3440 0.3946 0.4401 0.1724 0.1910 0.4052 0.1383 0.0980
EXOG (p-value) 0.0938 0.1425 0.1452 0.0841 0.1467 0.1397 0.1937 0.2991 0.3816
R2 0.954 0.956 0.956 0.951 0.953 0.960 0.934 0.951 0.951
F-test 1105.0 770.5 671.7 1376.3 774.0 685.2 1213.0 893.7 763.9
Sample size 102 100 100 102 100 100 102 100 100
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors
with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. We use simulated patent protection 
siv
i and
initial relative income yi   y1 as instruments for i. In all regressions we exclude the US, which is assumed to be
the frontier. In columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9), we drop Zaire and Zambia due to missing data. In columns
(2), (5) and (8), we add policy regressors sec, gov, inf, open. In columns (3), (6) and (9), we add policy regressors
plus dummy for OPEC countries. The term First-stage F-testrepresents the F stats in rst-stage regressions of
endogenous variables. OIDstands for Hansen J overidentication test of all instruments. ENDOGrepresents
the endogeneity test of endogenous regressors. EXOGstands for C test of exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect
instruments, where the suspect instruments are simulated patent protection and its interacted terms with legal
origins and initial relative income. All regressions are estimated by 2-step GMM estimator. We use the command
ivreg2in Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table IV: Relative-technology-level regression: 2SLS
Regression equation: yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full Empty Policy Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.292*** 0.305*** 0.304*** 0.369*** 0.400*** 0.400*** 0.391*** 0.422*** 0.414***
(4.34) (3.64) (3.61) (5.16) (4.40) (4.39) (4.76) (4.29) (4.23)
F 2.784*** 2.833*** 2.840*** 2.918*** 3.051*** 3.045*** 2.941*** 2.995*** 2.996***
(5.43) (4.79) (4.85) (5.92) (5.78) (6.04) (5.74) (6.13) (6.03)
F -0.643*** -0.674*** -0.676*** -0.684*** -0.734*** -0.733*** -0.698*** -0.761*** -0.762***
(-5.06) (-4.45) (-4.48) (-5.83) (-5.63) (-5.84) (-5.62) (-6.14) (-6.12)
y 0.882*** 0.896*** 0.901*** 0.864*** 0.889*** 0.888*** 0.898*** 0.942*** 0.956***
(25.42) (29.39) (26.68) (23.01) (27.69) (24.88) (21.56) (30.42) (28.65)
First-stage F-test
 194.5 79.72 83.33 194.5 79.72 83.33 194.5 79.72 83.33
F 9.576 9.914 9.184 7.946 8.351 8.363 11.12 3.532 3.713
  F 11.70 5.562 5.558 11.54 5.608 6.022 34.65 7.674 8.308
OID (p-value) 0.3158 0.4284 0.4361 0.2812 0.4381 0.4252 0.3226 0.2301 0.2973
ENDOG (p-value) 0.4931 0.3440 0.3946 0.4401 0.1724 0.1910 0.4052 0.1383 0.0980
EXOG (p-value) 0.0938 0.1425 0.1452 0.0841 0.1467 0.1397 0.1937 0.2991 0.3816
R2 0.960 0.963 0.963 0.959 0.960 0.960 0.944 0.954 0.955
F-test 1023.6 690.9 604.0 1127.0 642.5 578.7 698.1 731.3 623.6
Sample size 102 100 100 102 100 100 102 100 100
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors
with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. We use simulated patent protection 
siv
i and
initial relative income yi   y1 as instruments for i. In all regressions we exclude the US, which is assumed to be
the frontier. In columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9), we drop Zaire and Zambia due to missing data. In columns
(2), (5) and (8), we add policy regressors sec, gov, inf, open. In columns (3), (6) and (9), we add policy regressors
plus dummy for OPEC countries. The term First-stage F-testrepresents the F stats in rst-stage regressions of
endogenous variables. OIDstands for Hansen J overidentication test of all instruments. ENDOGrepresents
the endogeneity test of endogenous regressors. EXOGstands for C test of exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect
instruments, where the suspect instruments are simulated patent protection and its interacted terms with legal
origins and initial relative income. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS estimator. We use the command ivreg2
in Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table V: Convergence club membership
1 2
Countries most likely to converge Countries uncertain to converge
Cyprus Ireland United Kingdom Greece Poland
Japan Pakistan Canada Gabon Bulgaria
Thailand India Germany Finland Hungary
Malaysia Bangladesh Austria Denmark Romania
Switzerland Honduras Netherlands Turkey
Jordan New Zealand Sweden Rwanda
China Iran Mali Mexico
Guyana Morocco Israel Philippines
Malta Paraguay France Central African Republic
Luxembourg Brazil Peru Botswana
Iceland Costa Rica Australia Congo Republic
Singapore Bolivia Togo Sudan
Papua New Guinea Nepal Korea Republic Algeria
Portugal Cote dIvoire Ecuador Iraq
Tunisia Uruguay Zambia Tanzania
Panama Swaziland Norway Italy
Mozambique Trinidad and Tobago Malawi Argentina
Indonesia Dominican Republic Zimbabwe Ghana
South Africa Venezuela Burundi Jamaica*
Egypt Senegal Benin Sri Lanka
Mauritius Colombia Niger Uganda
Vietnam Mauritania Syria Haiti
Nicaragua Kenya Zaire El Salvador
Spain Cameroon Sierra Leone
Guatemala Liberia Belgium
Note: The estimated convergence parameters are based on the coe¢ cients in regression 1 of Table II. The
estimated convergence parameter increases within each group, as you move down each list and then to the right.
There are three groups of classication: countries most likely to converge, countries uncertain to converge, and
countries most likely to diverge in growth rate. A country is classied to the rst group if its estimated convergence
parameter is at least two standard deviation below zero, to the third group if its estimated convergence parameter
is at least two standard deviation above zero, and to the second group otherwise. However, there is no country
that belongs to the third group according to our estimates.
* The estimated convergence parameter is negative (indicating convergence) in countries before Jamaica and
positive (indicating divergence) in countries after (and including) Jamaica.
34
